25 Lukashenko’s Belarus: Stability Amongst Corruption by Mason Hughes

Abstract
This paper provides an government overview and brief history of Belarus, specifically highlighting the current President, Alexander Lukashenko. The history of which he takes office, as well as the early constitutional changes he made to stay in office will be evaluated. We will cover the soviet style social contracts that create stability as well as the attitudes of the citizens towards the president.
Introduction
Historical Background
How Belarus came about Belarusian history goes back further than the Soviet Union. The area has always been very volatile and changes have taken place numerous times depending on the reforms the current regime wished for. From Mongols, to Soviets, to Lukashenko, oppression is still oppression. The independence of the country finally came about with the collapse of the system they have lived with for a lifetime. Before the communist era and joining the USSR in 1922, Belarus was one of the poorest countries in this region of Europe. Once forcefully being united with the Soviets, they executed a five year plan to exponentially grow the country industrially (Ioffe, 2004, 86).
Belarus as a nation was very gradual in its development. The region that is now Belarus has been conquered and divided up by rulers, set on conquest, starting with the Baltics and the Eastern slavs. The Mongols forced the regional principalities into submission in the year 1237, however full unification of the local pagan tribes wouldn’t take place until October 24th, 1795. Russia, Austria, and Prussia divided the region, with Russia gaining the region which later became Belarus. Under Imperial Russia Belarusian nationalism was strongly discouraged. The use of the Belarusian language was prohibited and Catholic beliefs were pushed on the people to try to replace their Orthodox faith. The Russification, or the resettling of Russian nationals into other countries to strengthen Russia’s hold on the area, went on for many years creating a negative attitude towards Russian culture. In 1863, Belarusian peasants and insurgents joined an uprising against the Russian Empire, but independence did not sprout quite yet. During the October Revolution, urban workers united and overthrew the government. On July 31st, 1920 the Soviets conquered Belarus’s capital city Minsk from Poland and set up the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic (BSSR).
Years following the Soviets implementing the Korenizatziya Policy, which encouraged Belarusian language and culture along with new economic policies, led to rapid growth and industrialization across the BSSR. The BSSR joined the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1922. After the World War Two invasion and occupation by the Nazis which killed millions, the Soviets and Russians continued to implement Sovietization and Russification policies meant to isolate Belarus from Western Europe. The devastation that came along with World War Two impacted Belarus tremendously, wiping out a third of the region’s population (Ioffe, 2004, 86). In 1988, the nationalist Belarussian Popular Front (BPF) accused the Soviet government of trying to eliminate the Belarusian people upon the discovery of a mass grave site near Minsk. These people were killed during the Stalinist purges of 1937-1941. The Supreme Soviet issued the Declaration of State Sovereignty of the BSSR making Belarusian the official state language. When the Soviet Union collapsed, the BSSR became the Republic of Belarus, finally independent.
As independent Belarus appeared on the map, an entire state political system needed to be built and a strong president was found in Alexander Lukashenko. Belarus as a new country lacked independent traditions, which were essential when forming a new nation; instead, the USSR’s identity lingered (Kuleszewicz, 2018, p. 619). Free from Moscow’s top down command, Belarus was free to design their government how they pleased, but a relationship with their former brothers in Russia was still essential, in comparison to other countries that also were part of the Soviet Union which viewed Russia as an enemy. Lukashenko emerged seemingly out of nowhere. Before running for President, he was the head of a small state farm and was well known for authoring an article that warned of the possibility of a dictator arising in Belarus.
After giving a speech on the radio denouncing corruption, he defeated the current prime minister in the presidential election. Immediately after taking office, Lukashenko started to impose his autocratic rule (Way, 2020, pp. 18-19). Emboldening the office of the president, Lukashenko has managed to concentrate much economic and political power in his hands and in the hands of his office should he ever be removed.
Institutional Features: Corruption of State
In most dictatorships, whoever is in power generally is willing to do whatever it takes to stay in power and maintain control. Belarus is no different, from corrupt elections to constitutional changes. Power in Belarus is very centralized in the seat of the president. Changes of the constitution helps contribute to the mass amounts of corruption occurring throughout the country. President Lukanshenko rules with almost absolute power, making democracy a topic not spoken of much in Belarus. After taking office, he revised the constitution to extend his office terms and power. Under Lukashenko, it is deemed illegal to criticize the government as well as hold demonstrations that are deemed anti-government. The Western media outlets refer to Lukashenko as Europe’s last dictator.
In Belarus, the chief of state is the President, the head of government is the Prime Minister. The cabinet or council of ministers is selected by the President. Under the leadership of the President, the executive branch carries out government policy. The president is directly elected by an absolute majority popular vote, in more than one round if it is necessary, to a term of five years with no limits otherwise. The political system focuses most of its power in the seat of the President; these include appointment powers such as appointing the Prime Minister as well as Deputy Prime Ministers, who work directly under him. Another power the seat of the President holds is the power to execute laws and degrees for an undisputed amount of time. (Warfield, 2024).
Lukashenko has ruled Belarus with an iron fist since taking office, the way the government is structured, giving him almost absolute powers allows this, along with his elite and loyal military force. Other countries such as Poland and Lithuania do not recognize President Alexander Lukashenko as the legitimate president of Belarus. Lithuania hosts the main opposition candidate along with other members of the opposition (BBC, 2024). Belarus, after becoming independent, drafted a modern constitution introducing separation of powers and reducing the role of the Prime Minister. This constitution, also making Belarus a presidential democracy, was finally drafted and signed in 1994. Amendments can be proposed by the president to the national assembly or by a petition of at least 150,000 eligible voters. The complex system Belarus partially secured from the Soviet period has helped them survive this long.
Belarus’s stability can be largely attributed to its police force and military. It is thought Belarus has the largest law enforcement force per capita among post soviet states (Pranevičiūtė-Neliupšienė & Maksimiuk, 2012, pp. 107). A previous democratic opposition leader considered the powers held by Lukenskanko to be unlawful as he held the power to appoint and dismiss members of all courts including the supreme court (Kuleszewicz, 2018, p. 622).
In 1996, facing calls for impeachment, Lukashenko shut down the parliament, replacing it, and imposing a new constitution with a system where he was almost the supreme power of the country. Elections originally were more or less fair because the incumbent had not learned the manipulation tactics required to rig the elections but over the years fraud became more evident to the public, especially as Lukashenko’s popularity has declined significantly (Way, 2020, p.19; Silitski, 2005, pp. 85-86). For many years he portrayed a sentiment of invincibility in the polls. When the opposition attempted to deteriorate his popularity, Lukashenko introduced censorship in the media and established personal control over most state institutions (Silitski, 2005, p. 86).
Opposition candidates that challenge Lukashenko in Belarus are always silenced in some way, some have been arrested, but all have been censored in one way or another when they have been interviewed. In electoral authoritarian states it is important for the authorities at large to maintain a level of control over the election and the rules. The government of Belarus refuses to allow the opposition to spread unrest and democracy to the public (Bedford, 2017, pp. 386-387). Current opposition leaders for Belarus are not located in Belarus, they hold out in neighboring countries where they may rally supporters to aid in their cause. Many of his former opponents were executed by a death squad, according to a credible Belarusian security agent (Ó Beacháin &
Polese, 2010, p. 124).
The attitudes of Belarusians vary in regard to the President and the current regime. Social contracts were what the country’s foundation was built on and Lukaskenko has attempted to change them to better fit his political needs. Fear is a leading factor for loyalty when in the past social contracts were important for stability. When the communist era came to an end Belarus had an identity problem. Gaining independence was unexpected for the members of the Soviet Union and so the Belarusian culture retained many soviet attributes as they searched for a sense of belonging as did other countries who were pushed into independence. Much of the support from Belarusians came because they viewed Lukashenko as a protector of their Russian culture (Manaev et al., 2011, p. 102, 105).
Lukashenko’s popularity has significantly declined over the many years he has retained office, however many view him as the only man for the job, they feel a strong leader is an essential part of their government (Korosteleva, 2003, pp. 527-530). It is beginning to be clearer as the years pass that people of a younger age group are more inclined to democracy than the older generation. This is seen more amongst those born who have not lived through communist rule. Younger generations are also more likely to be skeptical of regimes with heavy control by the state. This is why Lukanshenko’s popularity is continuing to decline (Krawatzek & Langbein, 2022, p. 108).
For Belarusians to have trust in their institutions such as the army and armed security forces was a key value. In an authoritarian system trust in public institutions speaks volumes to how citizens relate to their political and social environments. One reason the army is such a trusted institution is because the citizens view that it operates separate from politics. The army and other security apparatuses are seen as the external protectors of the country and young Belarusians in particular place a high amount of trust here. The president also receives high trust ratings. However, it is a sensitive question and respondents may have self-censored their views due to fear of retaliation. Higher trust in the President was expressed by women, especially younger women with children (Krawatzek, 2019, pp. 20-21).
There is an unspoken social contract between the president of Belarus and the people. This contract provides Belarusians with a basic level of social and financial stability. In exchange for this stability the people give the country their support. The general understanding of this contract is that, there are no alternatives and fear of repression is a leading factor for loyalty. This contract means opportunities to find a job along with a variety of services and subsidized prices will be provided. This was made possible due to the cheaply run industry and the income that was generated by the heavily imported natural gas and crude oil received from Russia. This soviet style social contract’s stability that was promised has faltered. Along with it the loyalty that was promised to Lukashenko.
Lukashenko, who is the Belarusian Government, has tried shifting the social contract to more of a security contract. As the economic crisis affects the world and inflation is on the rise it is hard to keep the citizens paid and fed. Providing security for the country, which he already needs to do, seems a much easier task. Although strained, the social contract/policy still exists and to an extent works. However one must remember that most of the loyalists are part of a socially vulnerable group, living in areas which require more support, being either resources or financially from the government (Bedford, 2021, pp. 810-811; Pranevičiūtė-Neliupšienė & Maksimiuk, 2012, p. 122).
Conclusion: Belarus’s Future
The European Union (EU) does their due diligence to push democracy in Belarus as well as it can, but as authoritarianism has grown over the years, it has put Belarus and the EU in direct opposition. In 2006, the EU reached out to the people of Belarus, underlining the illegitimacy of their leadership and laying out steps to become a partner. These steps included a change of regimes, as well as a complete political and economic structural change. The biggest problem the EU faces when trying to reach the people of Belarus is that the political regime in Minsk, Belarus’s capital city, sees the EU as a direct threat to their existence and so acts accordingly (Nice, 2012, pp. 8-9). Regime change would surely result in the replacement of Lukashenko’s dictatorship. Losing power would likely result in arrest or exile.
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